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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
SOVEREIGNTY: Sovereign Immunity: State
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 111
S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
In 1980, Alaska enacted a revenue-sharing statute that pro-
vided $25,000 per year to each unincorporated native village
government. Acting upon an opinion by the Alaska Attorney
General that the statute was unconstitutional because it was
based upon racially exclusive organizations, the state enlarged
the program to include all unincorporated communities, whether
native or not. The Alaska Legislature repealed the statute and
replaced it with one that reflected the expanded program. As a
result, the Native Village of Noatak (the Village) never received
the $25,000 per year it felt the state owed under the original
statute.
The Village filed suit in federal district court on equal pro-
tection grounds and sought an order requiring the Commissioner
of Alaska's Department of Community and Regional Affairs to
pay the money that the village would have received.' The district
court initially issued the injunction but then dismissed the suit
as violating the Eleventh Amendment. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, first on the ground that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362 constituted a congressional abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity;2 and then, upon reconsideration, on the
ground that Alaska had no immunity against suits by Indian
tribes.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari4 and reversed and
remanded.-
The Village presented arguments that the eleventh amendment
did not bar suits brought against states by Indian tribes6 and,
1. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, No. CV-85-503-AJK (D. Alaska 1985)
(unreported).
2. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 872 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1989) (later
withdrawn).
3. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1989).
4. Hoffman v. Native Village of Noatak & Circle Village, 111 S. Ct. 37 (1990).
5. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak & Circle Village, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2586
(1991).
6. Id. at 2581.
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in the alternative that even if it did, the adoption of 28 U.S.C.§ 1362 eliminated the constitutional bar to suit.7 The Court
answered that the states enter the federal system with their
sovereignty intact and that they are not subject to suit absent
their consent, either expressly or in the "plan of the conven-
tion." 8 The Court found no consent to suit by Indian tribes. 9
In resisting the Village's argument that § 1362 abrogated the
state's immunity to suit, the Court applied a narrow construction
to the statute by stating that it only modifies the minimum
amount in controversy as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1331.10
The Village's final argument was that even if the Eleventh
Amendment barred their suit for damages, it would not bar
their claim for injunctive relief. 11 The Court remanded this issue
to tfle appeals court for determination. 2 The judgment of the
Ninth Circuit was accordingly reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
delivered a dissenting opinion expressing his disagreement with
the Court's preclusion of the case on the constitutional grounds
and narrow construction of the statute. 13
SOVEREIGNTY: Sovereign Immunity: Tribal
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991).
The Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma
(Tribe) owned and operated a convenience store within the state
of Oklahoma for many years on land held in trust for it by the
federal government. The store has never collected Oklahoma's
cigarette tax on sales of cigarettes at the store. In 1987, the
Oklahoma Tax Commission served the Tribe with an assessment
letter demanding that the Tribe pay the state $2.7 million in
cigarette taxes owed from 1982 through 1986.
The Tribe filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma to enjoin the assessment.'
7. Id. at 2583.
:3. Id. at 2581.
9. Id. at 2582.
10. Id. at 2583.
11. Id. at 2586.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2586-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1. Citizen Bank Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, No. CIV-
87-0338-W (W.D. Okla. 1987).
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The state counterclaimed asking the court to enforce the assess-
ment and enjoin the Tribe from future sales unless the state
cigarette tax was collected and remitted to the state. The district
court denied the Tribe's motion to dismiss the counterclaim on
the grounds of sovereign immunity because the Tribe had not
consented to the suit. The court held that the Tribe is immune
from suit to collect past unpaid taxes since Oklahoma lacks the
authority to tax the on-reservation sales of cigarettes to tribal
members or to tax the Tribe directly.2 The district court ordered
the Tribe to collect taxes on sales to nontribal members and to
comply with all statutory recordkeeping requirements.3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed 4 and held that the district court erred in entertaining
the state's counterclaims because the Tribe is absolutely immune
from the suit and had not waived its sovereign immunity by
filing an action for injunctive relief.5 The court further held that
the state lacks the authority to impose any tax on sales that
occur on the reservation, regardless of whether the sales are to
tribal or nontribal members.6
The Tenth Circuit noted that the store was located on land
"over which the Potawatomis retain sovereign immunity, ' 7 and
that Congress had not granted Oklahoma an independent juris-
dictional grant of authority to tax the store's transactions." The
court of appeals ordered the district court to grant the Tribe's
request for an injunction.9 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to resolve an apparent conflict with its pre-
cedents and to clarify the law of sovereign immunity with respect
to the collection of sales taxes on Indian lands." 10
The State urged the Court to construe narrowly or abandon
the doctrine of sovereign immunity of Indian tribes and pre-
sented the argument that the Tribe waived its immunity when
it filed an action for injunctive relief.1 The unanimous opinion,
2. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905,
908 (1991).
3. Id.
4. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 888 F.2d 1303
(10th Cir. 1989).
5. Id. at 1305.
6. Id. at 1306-07.
7. Id. at 1306.
8. Id. at 1307.
9. Id.
10. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905,
909 (1991).
11. Id.
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delivered by Justice Rehnquist, explained that Congress has the
power to modify or eliminate the doctrine of sovereign immunity
of Indian tribes but Congress chose instead to promote the
"goal of Indian self-government, including its 'overriding goal'
of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic develop-
ment.' 1 2 Because the land upon which the cigarette sales oc-
curred was land that was held by the federal government for
the benefit of the Indians, it qualified as a reservation for tribal
immunity purposes. 13 As the Tribe possesses sovereign immunity
against direct suit, it also possesses immunity from cross-suits. 14
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Reservation15 and Moe v. Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes16 and reversed the Tenth Circuit. The Court
held that Indian retailers on an Indian reservation may be
required to collect state taxes on sales to non-Indians.' 7
The state complained that the Court's position left it with a
right but without a remedy. The Court offered alternatives to
the state by which it might collect the taxes without bringing
suit directly against the Tribe: bringing suit against individual
agents or officers of a tribe, collecting the sales tax from who-
lesalers, or entering into agreements with the tribes for the
collection of the taxes. 8 The decision of the court of appeals
was accordingly affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Justice Stevens filed a concurrence in which he stated that the
unanimous opinion implicitly limits the sovereignty of Indian
Tribes.19 The concurring Justice further opined that it was un-
necessary for the Court to decide the question of the Tribe's
prospective liability for state taxes since the question was only
properly presented in the state's counterclaim. 20
On remand, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its
previous opinion except for that language that conflicted with
the decision of the Supreme Court.2' The court then remanded
12. Id. at 910 (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202, 216 (1987)).
13. Id. (citing United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978)).
14. Id. at 909 (following United States v. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 309 U.S.
506, 511-12 (1940)).
15. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
16. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
17. Citizen Band Potawatomi, 111 S. Ct. at 911 (citing Moe, 425 U.S. at 483).
18. Id. at 912.
19. Id. at 912-13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
20. Id.
21. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 932 F.2d
1355 (10th Cir. 1991).
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to the district court with directions to dismiss the defendants'
counterclaim and enter an injunction prohibiting the Tax Com-
mission from enforcing the challenged assessment against the
Tribe. n
The district court recognized that its Judgment entered on
January 4, 1990, already complied with the Tenth Circuit's
directions. 23 The court therefore adopted that portion of the
Judgment of January 4, 1990, and proclaimed it to be in force
and effect.2 4
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
RELIGION: Customs, Traditions and Culture
Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210
(5th Cir. 1991).
The Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. (Peyote Way) was
created by a former member of the Native Americam Church
(NAC). The majority of its approximately 150 members were
not of Native American descent. While Peyote Way subscribed
to many similar tenets, it was not affiliated with NAC. Both
Federal and Texas statutes criminalized unprescribed possession
and distribution of peyote.1 However, bona fide religious use of
peyote by members of the NAC was exempted from the statutes. 2
Peyote Way sued for a declaratory judgment that the federal
and Texas laws prohibiting peyote possession by anyone other
than NAC members were unconstitutional and requested the
district court to enjoin the Attorneys General of the United
States and Texas from enforcing the peyote laws against Peyote
Way or its members.3
The district court found that: 1) the intent of Congress to
exempt the use of peyote by the NAC is clear; 2) there is no
free exercise or implied privacy right to use peyote under the
U.S. Constitution; and, 3) the exemption of the NAC does not
22. Id.
23. Order of Dismissal and Entry of Injunction, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, No. CIV-87-0338-W (July 31, 1991), at 2.
24. Id.
1. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841, 844 (1988); TEx. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE ANN. §§
481.101-481.130 (Vernon 1991).
2. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1991); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.111
(Vernon 1991).
3. Peyote Way Church of God v. Meese, 698 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
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violate the equal protection or establishment clauses .4 The Fifth
Circuit conducted a de novo review of the district court's con-
clusions of constitutional law. 5
In addressing Peyote Way's contentions that they should be
afforded treatment equal to that given to the NAC, the court
noted that the Commissioner of Food and Drugs first promul-
ga:ed the NAC exemption in March of 1966 with apparent
congressional approval. 6 The court further noted that prior cases
in district courts were in conflict on the issue of whether Con-
gress intended to exempt only members of NAC.7 The court
concluded, however, that the federal and Texas laws unambig-
uously exempt only NAC members.8
An analysis of NAC and Peyote Way convinced the court
that NAC represented a political classification whose preferential
treatment could be rationally tied to the fulfillment of Congress'
fiduciary obligation to the Indians. 9 Peyote Way was found to
not represent a political classification. 0
]In addressing arguments concerning the establishment clause,
the court found that the protection of NAC by federal statute
is not an establishment of religion contravening the first amend-
ment.' It is actually the protection of the culture of quasi-
sovereign Native American Tribes. 12
In turning its attention toward the Texas exemption of NAC
from its criminal drug statutes, the court explained Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith3 as holding
that states have a choice of conforming or not conforming with
4. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th
Cir. 1991).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1214. The Drug Enforcement Regulation is now codified at 21 C.F.R. §
1307.31, which provides in pertinent part: "The listing of peyote as a controlled substance
[under federal law] does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious
ceremonies of the Native American Church ... " 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1991) (citing as
authority 21 U.S.C. §§ 821, 822(d), and 871(b)). The regulation first appeared in 31
Fed. Reg. 4679 (1966).
7. Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1214.
8. Id.
9. Id. (utilizing an analysis of Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)). See also
Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1216 (the government's unique obligation was one of cultural
preservation).
10. Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1216.
11. Id. at 1217.
12. Id.
13. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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the federal NAC exemption.' 4 Therefore, the court had before
it an issue that had not yet been addressed by American courts:
"[W]hether states may enact laws beneficial to tribal Native
Americans in exercise of the federal government's trust power
pursuant to implied congressional authorization. ' ' 5
Finding that Congress had not expressly authorized states to
adopt the federal NAC exemption, the Fifth Circuit found that
it would be preposterous to attribute any other intent to Con-
gress than to let the states decide whether or not to adopt the
NAC exemption.' 6 It also emphasized that in passing 21 U.S.C.
§ 903, Congress left intact the states' drug enforcement struc-
tures.'17 Therefore, under congressional policy and Smith, states
may refuse all exemptions, exempt only NAC members, or
exempt all religious use of peyote.' 8 Thus, as a proper exercise
of the federal trust power, the NAC exemption present in Texas
law withstands challenges under the equal protection and estab-
lishment clauses.' 9 The decision of the district court to deny
Peyote Way declaratory and injunctive relief was affirmed. 20
A dissenting opinion was filed to disagree with the majority
on the issue of the establishment of a religion.2' The dissenting
justice opined that the NAC exemption was unconstitutional
because it was strictly a religious exemption.2
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RIGHTS-OF-WAY AND EASEMENTS: Railroads
TAXATION: Real Property
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d
899 (9th Cir. 1991).
The Burlington Railroad Company uses rights of way across
the reservations of the Blackfeet, Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes
pursuant to agreements created in 1886 and 1887. In 1986, the
14. Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1218.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. ("States may regulate drugs concurrently with Congress unless there is a
'positive conflict' between federal and state law.").
18. Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1218.
19. Id. at 1219-20.
20. Id. at 1220.
21. Id. at 1220-21 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1220.
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Blackfeet Tribe imposed a tax on all nonexempt possessory
interests on their reservation. In 1987, the Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes imposed a tax on all nonexempt utility property within
Fort Peck Reservation. Both taxes were approved by the Sec-
retary of the Interior in 1987 and were applied to the Appellant
railroad company.
The railroad company brought separate suits against the Tribes,
their governing bodies, and various tribal officials, seeking de-
claratory judgment that the Tribes lacked sovereign power to
tax the on-reservation rights of way and an injunction barring
the application of such taxes.' The district court denied the
Tribes' motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity
but granted the Tribes' motion for summary judgment on the
merits.2 The cases were consolidated on appeal.'
In addressing the Tribes' motion to dismiss on grounds of
sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for prospective
relief against tribal officers allegedly acting in violation of fed-
eral law.4 In other words, suit may be brought against tribal
officers to test the constitutionality of the taxes they seek to
collect Turning to the merits, the court held that: 1) a right-
of-way grant does not extinguish a tribe's property interest;6 2)
the railroad company received benefits from the tribes for which
it may be taxed;7 and, 3) the Railroad Revitilization and Reg-
ulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) did not divest the Tribes
of their authority to tax railroad companies.8 Rejecting the
railroad company's arguments that the tribal taxation of the
railroad company violated the 4-R Act and the commerce clause,
the court dismissed the Tribes, and their legislative and executive
bodies on grounds of sovereign immunity, and affirmed the
district court's decision as to the other defendants. 9
1. Burlington N. R.R. v. Fort Peck Tribal Executive Bd., 701 F. Supp. 1493 (D.
Mont. 1988).
2. Id. at 900.
3. Burlington N. R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899, 900 n.l (9th Cir. 1991).
4. Id. at 901 (citing California v. Harvier, 700 F.2d 1217, 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.
1983) (Norris, J., dissenting)).
5. Burlington, 924 F.2d at 901-02 (citing Tenneco Oil Co. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of
Indians, 725 F.2d 572, 574 (10th Cir. 1984); Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1332-
33 (7th Cir. 1983)).
6. Id. at 904 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141-42
(1982)).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 905.
9. Id. at 905-06.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ABORIGINAL TITLE: Extinguishment and Recognition of
Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo (Cayuga IV), 58
F. Supp. 107 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
The Cayuga Indian Nation of New York and the Seneca-
Cayuga Nation of Oklahoma, as plaintiff-intervenor (Tribes),
sought recovery of 64,000 acres and damages in the form of
fair rental value for almost 200 years, and other monetary and
protective relief.' This is the fourth action concerning these
claims.
In Cayuga 1,2 the court held that the Tribes could present
evidence to support their claims. 3 The court denied both parties'
motions for summary judgment in Cayuga Indian Nation v.
Cuomo [Cayuga 11].4 In Cayuga III, the Tribes' motion for
partial summary judgment was granted and the court held that
the agreements between New York and the plaintiff Tribes
entered into in 1795 and 1807 (purporting to convey the Tribes'
interest in the land to the state) were invalid.5 In the instant
action, the court granted the Tribes' motion for partial summary
judgment. The court held that the defense of abandonment is
insufficient as a matter of law because the Treaty of Canan-
daigua conferred recognized title of the land to the Tribes.6
Utilizing an analysis of the differences between aboriginal and
recognized title to Indian land,7 the court determined that the
1794 Treaty of Canandaigua contains unambiguous language
which conveyed recognized title to the land to the Cayuga
Nation.8 As the court recognized the title that was conveyed by
the Treaty, abandonment is not a defense to the Tribes' claims
since only Congress can divest the Tribes of their title to the
land.9
1. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 758 F. Supp. 107, 109 (N.D.N.Y.
1991) (Cayuga IV).
2. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (Cayuga
1).
3. Id. at 1330.
4. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 667 F. Supp. 938, 949 (N.D.N.Y. 1987)
(Cayuga I]).
5. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 730 F. Supp. 485, 493 (N.D.N.Y. 1990)
(Cayuga II1).
6. Cayuga IV, 758 F. Supp. at 118.
7. Id. at 110.
8. Id. at 115.
9. Id.
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In addressing New York's claim that the Treaty deprived it
from a property interest in the land, the district court found
that the state only possesses, at most, a right of preemption
regarding the purchase of the land after Congress had extin-
guised the recognized title in the Tribes. 0 Accordingly, the
Tribes' motion for partial summary judgment was granted."
ABORIGINAL TITLE: Extinguishment and Recognition of
Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo (Cayuga V), 762
F. Supp. 30 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
This is the fifth memorandum-decision issued by the court
concerning the instant case and the preceeding case summary is
incorporated herein by reference. For a brief summary of the
most recent action, Cayuga IV,' the court granted the Tribes'
motion for partial summary judgment and held that the defense
of abandonment is insufficient as a matter of law because the
Treaty of Canandaigua conferred recognized title to the land to
the Indian Tribes. 2 In this action, Defendant Consolidated Rail
Corporation (Conrail) moved for summary judgment dismissing
the Tribes' complaint as against it.' Conrail asserted that the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act (RRR Act),4 which created
Conrail, established the Special Railroad Reorganization Court
(Special Court) which had original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear claims challenging title to the lands granted it under the
RRR Act. 5
The court listed three questions before it: whether, 1) the
property at issue was conveyed to Conrail under the RRR Act; 6
2) such conveyance should be set aside or annuled; and, 3) the
Special Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the Tribes'
claims against Conrail.7 The court concluded that the property
had been conveyed to Conrail under the RRR Act because the
land in question had been given to Conrail by the Special Court
10. Id. at 116.
11. Id. at 118.
1. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 758 F. Supp. 107 (1991) (Cayuga IV).
2. Id. at 118.
3. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 762 F. Supp. 30, 31 (N.D.N.Y.
1991) (Cayuga P).
4. 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1988).
5. Cayuga V, 762 F. Supp. at 32.
6. Especially, 45 U.S.C. § 743(b) (1988).
7. Cayuga V, 762 F. Supp. at 32.
606
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"free and clear of liens and encumbrances" on March 25, 1976.8
Turning to the second question, the Tribes presented argu-
ments that the legislative history of the RRR Act did not show
that its passage was intended to extinguish any rights which the
Cayugas had to their reservation lands. 9 The Tribes further
argued that any conveyance of their lands would be subject to
the Non-Intercourse Act10 and Conrail's claims were void ab
initio because the purported conveyances were not approved by
the Secretary of the Interior." The court found, however, that
the lands in question had not yet been adjudicated as being
Indian lands.' 2 Therefore, the Special Court did not need explicit
congressional authorization to convey the lands and the convey-
ances were not subject to the Non-Intercourse Act.13 Since the
Tribes' challenge asked the court to find the conveyances void
ab initio, it concerned the central function of the Special Court
which had jurisdiction over the matter. 14 The remaining question
for the court was whether this jurisdiction was exclusive or
concurrent. 5
Noting that the language of the RRR Act was plain and
unambiguous 16 and looking again to the legislative history of
the RRR Act, 17 the court found that jurisdiction over the Tribes'
claims as to Conrail rests exclusively in the Special Court. 8
Accordingly, the Tribes' claims against Conrail were dismissed.' 9
STATE COURTS
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: Tribal Intervention
In re Guardianship of Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684 (Okla. 1991).
A full-blood Seminole child whose father had died lived most
of his life with his mother and his "Indian Grandmother" who
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Specifically, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988).
11. Cayuga V, 762 F. Supp. at 33.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 34-35.
15. Id. at 35.
16. "[L]awsuits which seek to set aside or annul conveyances made under the RRR
Act shall be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court". Id.
17. Cayuga V, 762 F. Supp. at 35.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 36.
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was in fact his great aunt. The child's paternal grandparents
filed a petition for guardianship and temporary custody in an
Oklahoma court on May 17, 1989. The case presented issues
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) since the child was
Indian and the case did not present either of the two exceptions
defined by the ICWA. 1 The Seminole Tribe received notice of
the proceeding on July 10, 1989 and first responded on October
16, 1989, through a letter to the trial court's secretary. The
letter was treated as a motion to intervene which the court
denied. Four days later, the court issued letters of guardianship
to the grandparents.
The mother appealed and the Oklahoma Supreme Court rec-
ognized two issues: "1) whether the tribe can wait to intervene
until the dispositional stage of the proceeding; and, 2) whether
the mother may challenge the failure of the trial court to allow
intervention even though the tribe did not appeal. ' 2
The majority opinion recognized that the purpose of the
ICWA is to prevent the removal of Indian children from their
culture.3 Because placement of the child in an Indian community
is the focal point of the ICWA, the court concluded, the mother
has the right to raise the issue on appeal. 4
Quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c), 5 the court held that a tribe does
not waive its right to intervene because it waits until the dis-
positional stage before it intervenes. 6 Therefore, the trial court
erred when it refused to allow the tribe to intervene and the
case was reversed and remanded.7
A dissenting opinion disagreed with the holding that a mother
car raise the rights and interests of a tribe on appeal. 8 Further-
more, the dissent argued that the ICWA does not apply to intra-
family disputes. 9
1. In re Guardianship of Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684, 688 (Okla. 1991). The two
exceptions are custody provisions of a divorce decree and delinquency proceedings. 25
U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988); In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. App. 1986).
2. Q.G.M., 808 P.2d at 687.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 688.
5. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) provides in pertinent part: "... and the Indian
child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding." 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(c) (1988).
6. Q.G.M., 808 P.2d at 689.
7. id.
8. Id. at 689-91 (Simms, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 690-91.
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An opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part concurred
that the trial court erred in not allowing the tribe to intervene.10
However, the Justice argued that a mother does not have the
capacity to raise an issue on appeal where the tribe does not
appeal or join the mother's appeal.'
JURIES: Fair-Cross-Section
Sellers v. Oklahoma, 809 P.2d 676 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
The defendant was convicted of three counts of Murder in
the first degree and sentenced to death on each count. On direct
appeal he alleged, inter alia, that the jury did not fulfill the
fair-cross-section requirement
The court applied guidelines established by the Supreme Court
in Duren v. Missouri2 and held that a defendant must show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "dis-
tinctive" group in the community; (2) that the repre-
sentation of this group in venires from which juries
are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to
the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.3
The court found that the Defendant failed to establish the
second prong of the Duren test and affirmed his conviction.4
TAXATION: Cigarettes
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. City Vending, 62 Okla. B.J. 1377
(1991).
City Vending was a cigarette wholesaler whose client list
included Indian nations such as the Citizen Band Potawatomi
Tribe. The Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe had previously been
recognized by the Oklahoma Tax Commission (Commission) as
10. Id. at 689 (Hodges, V.C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
11. Id.
1. Sellers v. Oklahoma, 809 P.2d 676, 681 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). Fair-cross-
section requires that a jury represent, in reasonable fractions, the racial make up of the
community in which it sits. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (as interpreted in Duren v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 357 (1979)).
2. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
3. Sellers, 809 P.2d at 681-82 (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364).
4. Id. at 692.
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being exempt from sales tax.' City Vending had not purchased
state tax stamps for the cigarettes that it sold to Indian tribes,
claiming that such sales were exempt from taxation under the
Indian Commerce Clause. The Indian Tribes serviced by City
Vending resold the cigarettes in retail outlets or smokeshops.
On May 31, 1985, the Commission assessed taxes and interest
in the amount of $83,794.45 against City Vending for cigarettes
that it had sold to the tribes without tax stamps. The Commis-
sion held a hearing before an administrative law Judge to de-
termine whether it could revoke City Vending's wholesale license
on July 24, 1985, and City Vending raised arguments based
upon the Indian Commerce Clause.2 The judge held that he did
not have the authority to decide constitutional questions, but
under Oklahoma law, the taxes could be collected and City
Vending's wholesale license could be revoked. The Commission
instantly revoked the license.3
City Vending paid the assessment under protest but continued
to sell cigarettes without tax stamps or a wholesale license. On
October 30, 1985, the Commission filed suit in an Oklahoma
district court seeking a permanent injunction against such prac-
tices. In spite of City Vending's arguments concerning the Indian
Commerce Clause, the district court granted the requested relief
and issued a permanent injunction on November 27, 1985. 4 The
Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision in an
unpublished opinion, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted
certiorari on March 2, 1990.5
Meanwhile, on November 20, 1985, City Vending filed suit in
federal district court raising the Indian Commerce Clause ques-
tiort. The federal district court agreed with the Commission's
argument that the suit represented an appeal of the administra-
tive hearing and that it was filed out of time. The case was
dismissed. 6
City Vending then filed a similar action in Oklahoma County
District Court. The district court found that the Commission's
order was void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction. 7 The Commis-
1. Letter from Oklahoma Tax Commission to Citizen Potawatomi Tribe (May 3,
1978).
2. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. City Vending, 62 OKLA. B.J. 1377, 1377 (1991).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1378.
6. Id. at 1377.
7. Id. at 1377-78.
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sion sought a writ of prohibition against the district court and
the Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction and granted
the writ on March 17, 1986.8
Since City Vending had raised a constitutional issue, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court described the issue as that of subject
matter jurisdiction.9 Citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians,'0 the court stated that in the area of state taxation
of tribal activities and members, taxation is not allowed unless
jurisdiction is expressly ceded to the state by Congress." How-
ever, a narrow exception to this general rule exists when the
state asserts jurisdiction over particular tribal activities involving
non-tribal members and non-Indians.12 The exception provides
that the special area of taxation of cigarette sales is separate
and distinct from general taxation.' 3 Drawing upon Washington
v. Confederated Tribes (Colville)14 and the recently decided Okla-
homa Tax Commissiion v. Citizen Band Potawatomie Indian
Tribe,'5 the court held that the state may tax cigarettes sold by
a tribal smokeshop to non-Indians and non-tribal members as
long as such taxation is not preempted by federal law.'
6
In order to escape federal preemption, state jurisdiction must
not interfere with, or be incompatible with federal or tribal
interests, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify
the assertion of state authority. 7 The court found that the state's
interest in a tax assessment is at its strongest while the Tribe's
interest is less significant as the Tribe is merely trying to market
an exception.' 8 The court stated that Colville is "indistinguish-
able", and that the tax burden is passed on to the ultimate
consumer. Therefore, the court concluded that the state cannot
tax sales to tribal members and sales to non-tribal members or
non-Indians in a like manner and the Commission's order was
8. Id. at 1378.
9. Id.
10. 480 U.S. 202 (1986).
11. City Vending, 62 OKLA. B.J. at 1380.
12. Id. (citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1986);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (Colville); Moe v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976)).
13. Id. at 1381.
14. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
15. 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991).
16. City Vending, 62 OKLA. B.J. at 1382.
17. Id. (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Indian Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334
(1983)).
18. City Vending, 62 OKLA. B.J. at 1383.
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void on its face. 19 Accordingly, the order of the Oklahoma Court
of Appeals was vacated, the order of the Commission was
Vacated as being void ab initio, the judgment of the district
court was reversed and the cause was remanded for vacation of
the permanent injunction that had been granted to the state.20
In an opinion to specially concur, 2' greater depth was given
to the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the cigarette
taxation question through Potawatomie, Colville, and Moe. The
opinion described the question as one for Congress - not the
judiciary.22 In the interim, "ambiguities in taxation laws con-
cerning federal consent to tax are, as a rule, resolved in favor
of tribal independence. '"21
Two dissenting Justices opinedu that the tax assessment was
valid and should have been left undisturbed and treated as a
final agency action.2
19. Id. at 1383.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1384-85 (Kauger, J., concurring specially).
22. Id. at 1385.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1386-88 (Opala, C.J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1387.
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